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the insusceptibility of navigable waterbeds to private ownership argument, derived from Article 453 of the Civil Code and
policy against private ownership of navigable
the famous public
3
waterbottoms.1
There are probably 500,000 or more acres of school or in
lieu lands in Louisiana and unknown quantities of other types
of land which may have been severable from state sovereignty
other than by patents under the pot pourri of ancient laws on
sales or grants of state lands. Undoubtedly, this poses much
chance for technical deficiencies in numerous ancient state
transfers, even though a large majority of school lands may have
not been sold. Have our courts, in the course of protecting state
titles to waterbottoms, created unreasonable headaches for dry
land title examiners, and a happy hunting ground for title or
lease busters? This writer trusts that our courts will understand this hazard to the public interest in stability of titles,
and in any case where navigable waters are not involved, refuse
to extend or reverse a regretable decision.
Given the probable paucity or antiquity of jurisprudence,
and resultant uncertainty in interpreting these old laws, the
unfamiliarity of the bar with their requirements for valid sales
by the state, the economic cost of investigating ancient transactions, the complications of gathering and the unreliability of
ancient evidence, the probable constitutional impossibility of
any new prescriptive statute to quiet titles insofar as mineral
rights are affected, the abundance of caution which title examiners must employ, and the simple injustice of divesting or
clouding numerous long-recognized titles, there are ample policy
it to dry
reasons to reverse the decision, or at least not extend
34
land titles. There are equally sound legal reasons.
SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS
Carlos E. Lazarus*
In Succession of Young,' and Succession of Ramp,2 the court
was again called upon to inquire into the nature and concept of
877 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966), still it seems ironic that a presumption contrary to
this reasoning was employed to support the state title in the Scott case. Moreover, the basic logic employed by Judge Tate on this point was rejected by the
majority in California Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 74 So.2d 1 (1954).
33. See e.g., Miami Corp. v. State, 186 La. 784, 173 So. 315 (1937).
34. See notes 29-33 supra.

*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 205 So.2d 791 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
2. 205 So.2d 86 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967), 252 La. 600, 212 So.2d 419 (1968).
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the 16gitime of forced heirs, and it again reasserted the proposition that a forced heir is entitled to his forced portion in full3
ownership, free from any charges, conditions or restrictions.
It suffices to read articles 1493-1496, 1498, 1502, and 1710 of
the Civil Code to confirm the correctness of this pronouncement.4 Under these articles, the forced heir's right to inherit the
portion reserved to him by law in the inheritance of the deceased is protected and guaranteed by limitations imposed upon
the faculty of making gratuitous dispositions, the reserved portion being, therefore, but the necessary consequence of these
limitations. From which it follows that the lgitime is a part of
the succession which is essentially inalienable, for it is protected
against gratuitous dispositions inter vivos or mortis causa, and
more emphatically, because the gratuitous alienation thereof to
the detriment of forced heirs is expressly prohibited. Thus, the
right to the l6gitime has always been recognized as a right of
succession, that is to say, as a right to inherit the forced portion
ab intestato.5
Nevertheless, it has recently been advocated that the l6gitime
is a money value that may be satisfied either in naked ownership
or in usufruct.' This is not only contrary to the basic concepts
as above summarized, 7 but there appears to be no visible basis
3. An exception is made where a usufruct is granted by law on the 16gitime of
the forced heir, and which may be confirmed by testament. See LA. CiV. Coi art.
916; Winsberg v. Winsberg, 233 La. 67, 96 So.2d 44 (1957) ; Succession of Moore,
40 La. Ann. 531, 4 So. 460 (1888). See also LA. CIv. CODE arts. 161.7-1624 providing
for the disinhersion of forced heirs for just cause in the manner therein provided.
4. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1493, 1494 (limiting the disposer's power of disposition
to a proportion of his property), 1495 (providing that the donor cannot deprive the
forced heirs "of the portion of his estate reserved for them by law"), and .1498
(forbidding the donor from disposing of the "legitimate portion"). It must be conceded that in matters of succession, the Louisiana Civil Code adopts French concepts,
and it must also be recognized that under the French Code and the jurisprudence
interpreting it, the reserved portion must -be left to the forced heir in kind and in
full ownership, and that it cannot be satisfied wvith a usufruct or even with a naked
ownership, even if the value of the usufruct or of the naked ownership is greater
than the value of the reserved portion. 11 AuBRY ET RAU DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS
nos 679, 683 (Esmein ed. 1956) ; 3 COLIN ET CAPITANT, COURS tiLtMENTAIRE nos
1494, 1495 (Julliot de ]a Morandi~re ed. 1945) ; 19 DEMoLoMaBE, COURS DE CODE
NAPOL ON nos 421,426, 429 (1876) ; 3 RIPERT ET BOULANOER, TRAITIl nLIMENTAIRE
DE DROIT CIVIL DF. 1'LANIOL nos. 1846, 1.847 (1951).
5. See Succession of Turnell, 32 La. Ann. 1218 (1880) ; Clarkson v. Clarkson,
13 La. Ann. 422 (1858).
6. Yiannopoulos, Testamentary Dispositions in Favor of the Surviving Spouse
and the Ldgitime of Descendants,28 LA. L. REV. 509, 511 (1968).
7. Thus Demolombe (op. cit supra, note 4, No. 429, p. 425) states: "The forced
heir cannot, therefore, be forced to accept; either a right of usufruct nor a right in
naked ownership; and this even though the value of either of these rights exceeds
the value of his reserved portion." Thus also Aubry & Rau (op. cit. supra, note 4,
§ 683, p. 34) concludes: ". . . [Blut, as the reserved portion is due in full ownership,
the disposer cannot simply leave his forced heir property either in naked ownership
or in usufruct, even if such property includes all the property of the succession."
(Emphasis added).
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in the legislation to support it." This assertion seems to be made
on the basis of article 1499 of the Louisiana Civil Code, providing
that if the deceased makes a donation of a usufruct or of an
annuity the value of which exceeds the disposable portion, the
forced heir has the option, either of executing the donation as
made, or of abandoning to the donee the disposable portion in full
ownership.9
It should be noted at once that although article 1499 is included in that chapter of the Code dealing with reduction of
excessive donations, it actually precludes such a reduction where
the donation is of such a nature that the value thereof cannot
be easily or accurately ascertained, with the result that it is
actually impossible to determine whether the donation has or
has not exceeded the disposable portion. In such cases the law
provides that the remedy of the heir is his right to exercise the
alternative which best suits his convenience. 10 It should also be
noted that article 1499 is limited in its application, and that it
contemplates a donation of a sum of money in the nature of a
usufruct or of an annuity, to be paid to the legatee, the value
of which exceeds the revenues that the disposable portion could
or would normally produce. It is in this sense that article 917
of the Code Napol6on, which is identical with article 1499 of the
Louisiana Civil Code, is interpreted and applied." In addition,
8. True it is that article 1845 of the Louisiana Trust Code provides that "an
unconditional income in trust, without an interest in principal. . . . satisfies the
l6gitime to the same extent as would a usufruct." But the difficulty is that there is
nothing in the legislation nor in the jurisprudence even suggesting that the l6gitime
may be satisfied with a usufruct. As a matter of fact, both the jurisprudence and
the legislation clearly compel the opposite conlusion.
9. But this is precisely :because the forced heir cannot, without his consent, le
compelled to accept anything less than full ownership.
10. Cf. 11 AUnRY ET RAU, DUsOIT CIVIL FRANQAIS no 684 bis (Esmein ed.
1956) ; 3 COLIN ET CAPITANT, COURS ]LEMLENTAIRE no 1547 (Julliot de la Morandi~re ed. 1945) ; 3 RIrERT r BOULANGER, TRAIT~t fL]MENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL
DE PLANIOL no 2705 (1951).
11. The example given by 3 RIPERT ET BOULANGER, TRAIt L]PIWMENTAIRE DE
DROIT CIVIL PLANIOL no 2704 (1951), is that of a succession the disposable portion
of which is 400,000 francs wherein the deceased has bequeathed the sum of 30,000
francs annually, to be paid to the legatee during his life. It is obvious, he states, that
the charge imposed on the heir of paying this legacy will exceed the revenues of the
disposable portion which, if invested at 3%, will produce only 12,000 francs. But
since this charge is temporary, and could terminate at any time in the near future,
the law gives the forced heir the option to execute the charge or to abandon the
disposable portion to the legatee.
Apparently, therefore, what is contemplated is not a double disposition of
usufruct and of naked ownership in which the legatee of the usufruct becomes a
usufructuary in the ordinary sense of the word, but only a single disposition of a
fixed sum of money in the nature of a usufruct to be paid periodically to the legatee
thereof during his life in amounts which exceed the revenues of the disposable portion. A literal interpretation of the article would so indicate, for it provides that if
the donation "be of a usufruct, orof an annuity," the value of which exceeds the disposable portion . . . " Obviously, where the donor disposes of the usufruct of all
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article 1499 can apply only if the disposable portion is given to
the forced heir at least in naked ownership. It goes without saying that the forced heir would not be able to exercise his option
of abandoning the disposable portion in full ownership to the
legatee of the usufruct had the deceased disposed of the same
or of a portion thereof in favor of others. And this, it seems, is
precisely the very raison d'etre of article 1499: Although the
donor may not impose any charges or conditions on the ldgitime,
he can always dispose of the disposable portion subject to any
valid charges or conditions he may care to impose,12 which the
heir is always free to accept or renounce. 13 For example, the
donor could make to this forced heir an additional legacy of the
disposable portion of his property (or the naked ownership
thereof) on condition that the heir take his l6gitime burdened
with a usufruct, giving him the right to elect whether he will
accept the bequest of the disposable portion with the charge on
the lgitime, or take his l~gitime in full ownership, but without
the disposable portion. 14 And this is precisely what the law provides may be done under article 1499, but which is quite the opposite from requiring the forced heir to accept naked ownership
against his will in satisfaction of his lgitime. In sum, all that
article 1499 provides is that, under certain circumstances, the
forced heir may elect between his l~gitime in full ownership, or
his l~gitime in naked ownership plus the disposable portion,
subject to a right of usufruct thereon. And this makes sense, for
a donation of usufruct is temporary, not permanent, and there
may be instances in which it would be to the best advantage
of the forced heir to accept naked ownership temporarily, in
exchange for full and perfect ownership of the entire inheritance
at the end of the usufruct.
Thus it is clear that article 1499 is exceptional in nature,
and for that reason, if for no other, cannot be extended by implication and applied in reverse, as it were, as it has been
suggested. 15 The same considerations are not present where the
his property, such a disposition exceeds the revenues that the disposable portion
could normally produce.

12. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1496, 1501, 1527.
13. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 946, 976, 977.
14. See 19 DEMOLOMBE, COURS DE CODE NAPOLEON no 430 (1876).
15. See Note, 41 TuL. L. REv. 210, 216, (1968). But see Succession of Williams,
184 So.2d 70, 73 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966), noted in 27 LA. L. REv. 423, 449

(1967), in which the court states: "Article 1493... means that the child is entitled
to one-third of the property of the disposer (not one-third of the value of such
property) as a forced portion of which he cannot be deprived, and we know of no

law which declares, or jurisprudence which holds, that the child's forced portion ... may be... satisfied... by the bequest to him of the usufruct of the
estate ..

"
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donation is a donation of naked ownership instead of a donation
of a usufruct or of an annuity. It must be noted that whereas
article 1499 may be in derogation of the principle that no charges
or conditions may be imposed on the lgitime, the condition is
one imposed by the law itself, and results only in a temporary
diminution of the forced heir's right of enjoyment, in exchange
for the total inheritance at an undeterminable future date,
whereas the reverse would impose a permanent diminution of
his right, even if only partial, in exchange for nothing at the
termination of the usufruct.
It should further be noted that at most, article 1499 only
gives the forced heir the option of executing the donation as
made, reserving to him the right to demand his l~gitime in full
ownership if he so desires; article 1499 does not bestow any
such alternative right on the donor or testator.
In Succession of Young, the testator bequeathed all his property to his daughter by a prior marriage, subject to the usufruct in favor of his second wife and widow. The court concluded that under the plain provisions of article 175216 regulating
donations between spouses, the bequest to the widow was excessive and that it should be reduced to the usufruct of the disposable two-thirds of the testator's property. 7 The widow's
contention that she was entitled either "to the usufruct of all
the.., property or to the disposable portion in naked (sic)
ownership," was rejected. 18
16. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1752 (as amended by La. Acts 1916, No. 116): "A
man or woman who contracts a second or subsequent marriage, having a child or
children by a former marriage, can give to his wife, or she to her husband, either
by donation inter vivos or by last will and testament, in full property or in usufruct,
all of that portion of his estate, or her estate, as the case may be, that he or she
could legally give to a stranger."
17. Under the Civil Code, donations between spouses were no different from
donations between other persons, except where the donor had children 'by a prior
marriage, in which case the disposable portion was originally fixed at a child's
portion in usufruct only, not to exceed 1/5 of the donor's estate. LA. CiV. CODE arts.
1746, 1752 (as originally enacted). In 1882, this portion was increased to 1/3 of
the donor's property which could be given either in usufruct or in full ownership.
LA. CIv. CODE art. 1752, as amended by La. Acts 1882, No. 13. As last amended
by La. Acts 1916, No. 116, article 1752 increases the disposable portion under such
circumstances to the portion that can be legally given to a stranger, which portion can -be given either "in full property or in usufruct." This phrase is a remnant of the legislation as first enacted, and is now apparently inconsequential for
it merely gives the donor the right of doing what he has the faculty of doing anyhow, that is, of disposing of the disposable portion in any manner he sees fit. It
is evident, therefore, that it no longer makes any difference whether the donor
has children by a prior marriage, or whether the disposition is made to a spouse
or to a stranger. The disposable portion will always be the same in all cases and is
limited only by the provisions of articles 1493 and 1494.
18. This contention was made on the authority of Succession of McLellan,
144 So.2d 291 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962). In that case, however, the deceased had
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In Succession of Ramp, the testator died survived by his
third wife, four children of a second marriage, and a child of
a first marriage, leaving a will in which he bequeathed the
usufruct of all his property to his widow, and "the forced portion of my estate to all my children share and share alike, subject to the usufruct in favor of my wife." The four children of
the second marriage attacked the will alleging testamentary incapacity, following which, a compromise agreement was entered
into between the plaintiffs and the executrix whereby the
plaintiffs agreed: (1) to dismiss the action of nullity, (2) to
accept the succession of their father in accordance with the terms
of the testament (thereby renouncing their 16gitime), and (3)
to make no further opposition to the will on any grounds. Subsequently, in answer to a rule filed by the executrix to show
cause why the legatees should not be sent into possession in accordance with the will, the children of the decreased filed an
opposition alleging the dispositions of the will impinged upon
their l6gitime. The court of appeal held that but for the compromise agreement, the four forced heirs of the second marriage
would be entitled to their forced portion free of the usufruct
in favor of the widow. 19 It concluded, however, that the agreement was in effect a partition of the succession and as such, null
for lesion beyond one-fourth, under article 1402 of the Civil
bequeathed to the surviving spouse the usufruct of all his property plus the dispo-

sable portion of his estate which consisted solely of his one-half interest in the
community formerly existing between him and his surviving widow. Thus, in effect,
the bequest to the widow consisted of the disposable portion in full ownership,
plus the usufruct of the lgitime of the forced heirs, which was reduced insofar as
this usufruct was concerned, and the widow was awarded the disposable portion in
full ownership, apparently in accordance with the expressed intention of the testator.
In ordering the reduction, however, the court used language indicating that the
widow was entitled to "the usufruct of the property or to the disposable portion in
naked ownership, but not both," which gives rise to the confusion. It is clear that the
same result would have been reached by the simple application of article 11710 of
the Civil Code, and that there was no need for the application of article 1.499 since
the disposable portion had already been bequeathed to the widow in full ownership.
and all the forced heir was claiming was his l~gitime free of the usufruct given to
the widow. Cf. Yiannopoulos, Testamentary Dispositions in Favor of the Surviving
Spouse and the Legitimate Descendants, 28 LA. I. REV. 509, 526 (1,968).
19. "The law is well settled and all parties hereto agree, that in the absence
of a valid agreement to the contrary, an heir is entitled to receive his forced
portion free of any usufruct whatsoever, with the exception of the usufruct of the
surviving spouse provided for in Article 91.6 of the Civil Code. It is clear in this
instance, however, that Article 916 is not applicable, and it is conceded by all of the
litigants that the heirs of the decedent by his second marriage would be entitled
to their forced portion free and clear of the executrix's usufruct, if they had not
signed and homologated the agreement referred to hereinabove." Succession of Ramp,
205 So.2d 86, 89 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967). After the opening of the succession, the
forced heir is free to renounce his inheritance altogether, and therefore there is no
reason why the plaintiffs in the above case could not have validly renounced their
rights to their l6gitime. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 946, 976, 977.
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Code. 20 The Supreme Court, although affirming the result
reached by the court of appeal, held that the agreement was
what it purported to be, namely, a transaction or compromise,
but that, as such, it was void to the extent of the renunciations
by the four forced heirs of their right to demand their l~gitime
in full ownership, these renunciations not being responsive to the
real intention of the parties."'
In both of these cases, therefore, the principle that the forced
heir is entitled to his l~gitime in full ownership, free from any
charges, conditions, or restrictions is clearly illustrated. Granting that in Young the provisions of article 1499 of the Civil
Code might have been invoked,'2" nevertheless it is clear that the

forced heir could not have been required to accept anything
less than full ownership in satisfaction of his lgitime.
The principle above discussed was also impliedly recognized
in Succession of Mulqueeny.23 In that case, pursuant to a prior
Supreme Court decree ordering reduction of excessive legacies
of homestead stock to satisfy the l~gitime of forced heirs, a final
account was filed by the executrix showing these reductions. The
plaintiff opposed the account, however, on the grounds that it
failed to include the revenues accruing on that portion of the
stock which formed part of the plaintiff's lgitime, alleging she
had become the owner thereof from the moment of the death of
the de cujus. "4 Citing article 1515, the court of appeal ordered
the executrix to restore to the plaintiff the dividends accruing
20. "In any event, the agreement obviously divided and partitioned the succession property in a manner different from that enunciated in the law of forced
heirship. Under these circumstances, it is evident that the 'compromise agreement'
is subject to rescission for lesion beyond one-fourth in conformity with the rationale
emanating from Article 1402 of the Civil Code." Succession of Ramp, 205 So.2d 86,
90 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
21. '"This, then, is not a compromise between a legatee and some of the heirs,
but it is simply a compromise by the succession through its representative of a suit
and claim of some of the forced heirs. The compromise must therefore be reformed
in order to effect the real intention of the parties as required under Article 3073
of the Civil Code." 212 So.2d 423-424 (La. 1968).
22. It should be noted that article 1499 gives the option to the forced heir,
and not to the legatee, and that this option may 'be exercised only under the limited
circumstances contemplated therein. Thus, it would seem that before article 1499
can apply, it would first be necessary to establish the intention of the disposer by
reference to the testamentary dispositions, for if the testator intended to alienate
or to burden only the disposable portion, there would be no occasion for the application of the article. Cf. Succession of McLellan, 144 So.2d 291 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1962).
23. 207 So.2d 216 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968), cert. granted, 251 La. 1079, 208
So.2d 536 (1968).
24. "Applying the civil law doctrine of le mort saisit le vif, she claims that
these revenues should be distributed to her as forced heir to the succession, and she
prays that the final account should allow her to receive approximately 70% of the
revenues.. . ." Id. at 217.
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to the proportionate share of the stock which formed part of
the forced portion of the plaintiff, and rejected the defendant's
contention, based on article 1921 of the Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure, that no interest was due. Of course, the reason for
article 1515 of the Civil Code is that the forced portion descends
to the forced heir in full ownership ab intestato and he is thereall the fruits accruing thereto since the
fore entitled to it with
25
death of the de cujus.
OBLIGATIONS
Safl Litvinoff*
In Minyard v. Curtis," the Housing Authority of New Orleans (HANO) entered into a contract with Pittman Construction Company for the construction of a certain section of the
Desire Street Housing Project. For this purpose Pittman entered into a subcontract with Minyard whereby the latter undertook the obligation of applying caulking materials according to
the terms of the general contract between Pittman and HANO.
Under this subcontract, Minyard was to receive $3,000 for the
work and for furnishing the materials; it is noteworthy that
this agreement restated the portions of the general contract
which were pertinent to the required application of caulking
materials.
In order to comply with the terms of the subcontract,
Minyard chose a caulking compound manufactured by Plastic
Products, Inc., and distributed by a subsidiary corporation,
Plastoid Products Company. A sample of this material was submitted to HANO's architects, and in transmitting to Pittman
the results of the chemical and physical analysis of the compound, Minyard endorsed the properties of it and guaranteed it
2
would comply with the specifications.
Upon approval of the sample, Minyard started the caulking
work, but the chosen compound did not behave according to expectations. On January 26, 1955 the clerk-of-the-works complained in writing to Pittman that "the caulking used is pulling away from wood, brick, aluminum and iron and does not
25. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1515: "The donee restores the fruits of what exceeds the
disposable portion only from the day of the donor's decease, if the demand of the
reduction was made within the year; otherwise from the day of the demand."
* Of the Louisiana State University Law Faculty.
1. 251 La. 624, 205 So.2d 422 (1967).
2. Id. at 631, 205 So.2d at 425.

